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NON-REVIEWABILITY OF EMERGENCY SUSPENSION POWERS
UNDER THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE AND
RODENTICIDE ACT: NOR-AM AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS, INC. v. HARDIN
In the recent case of Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v.
Hardin,' the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the
Secretary of Agriculture's exercise of emergency suspension power prior
to an administrative hearing under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act.2 The suspension was based upon a determination
that a certain agricultural pesticide was an imminent hazard to the
public. The Secretary's action was held unreviewable because the affected
manufacturer had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies,
despite the contention that the Secretary's determination was arbitrary
and capricious and the manufacturer was suffering irreparable injury.
1. Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, No. 18478 (7th Cir., Nov.
9, 1970) [hereinafter referred to as Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 1970].
2. 7 U.S.C. § 135b (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the FIFRA]:
(a) Every economic poison which is distributed, sold, or offered for sale . . .
shall be registered with the Secretary....
(c) If it does not appear to the Secretary that the article is such as to
warrant the proposed claims for it or if the article and its labeling and
other material required to be submitted do not comply with the provisions
of sections 135-135k of this title, he shall notify the applicant for registra-
tion of the manner in which the article, labeling or other material required to
be submitted fail to comply with said sections so as to afford the applicant for
registration an opportunity to make the corrections necessary . . . . As soon as
practicable after completion of the hearing, but not later than ninety days, the
Secretary shall evaluate the data and reports before him, act upon such objec-
tions and issue an order grantitng, denying, or canceling the registration or re-
quiring modification of the claims or the labeling. Such order shall be based only
on substantial evidence of record .... Notwithstanding any other provision of
this section, the Secretary may, when he finds that such action is necessary to pre-
vent an imminent hazard to the public, by order, suspend the registration of an
economic poison immediately. In such case, he shall give the registrant prompt
notice of such action and afford the registrant the opportunity to have the matter
submitted to an advisory committee and for an expedited hearing under this
section. Final orders of the Secretary under this section shall be subject to
judicial review, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (d) of this sec-
tion ....
(d) In a case of actual controversy as to the validity of any order under this
section, any person who will be adversely affected by such order may obtain
judicial review ....
3. The effect of suspending a registration is to prohibit all sale and distribution
of the product in interstate commerce. 7 U.S.C. § 135a(a) (1) (1964). A person who
sells, distributes or offers for sale an unregistered economic poison is subject to the
penalties of § 135(f), which provides for a fine of not more than 1,000 dollars. Other
provisions of the FIFRA provide for fines or imprisonment for not more than one year,
upon conviction of continued violations.
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The court's decision raises troublesome questions concerning the nature
of the Secretary's power under the Act and the scope of judicial review
when that power is allegedly abused.
I. FACTS
On February 18, 1970, the Division of Pesticide Regulation, United
States Department of Agriculture, under the authority of the FIFRA,
issued an emergency order3 suspending all registrations of Panogen
products manufactured by Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc.4 Rather
than await results of an advisory committee and expedited hearing, the
normal procedure as provided by the Act,5 Nor-Am sought injunctive
relief in the district court. A preliminary injunction was granted' and
thereafter affirmed by a three-judge panel in the Seventh Circuit," one
judge dissenting. On rehearing en banc, the court of appeals reversed8
on the theory that plaintiff had failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies.9 In a vigorous dissent, Judge Pell,"° who had written the
majority opinion in the earlier decision, focused upon the unusual facts of
this case to support his position.
Panogen is an "economic poison"" and as such is subject to
regulation under the FIFRA." It has been marketed by the plaintiff for
over twenty years, during which time it has been estimated to have in-
creased crop yield in excess of eight billion dollars, and is without an
economically feasible substitute. Panogen products have always con-
4. The Secretary's order of suspension involved 17 cyano (methylmercury)
guanidine products which are used for seed treatment. They are referred to throughout
the decisions as "Panogen." Under the terms of the FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 135(d),
Panogen products fall within the category of "fungicides."
5. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c). In the Nor-Am cases § 135b(c) is referred to as § 4(c)
of the 1964 amendments to the FIFRA. For partial text of § 135b(c) see note 2 supra.
6. Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, Civil No. 70 C 838, (N.D. Ill.,
Apr. 21, 1970).
7. Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, No. 18478 (7th Cir., July 15,
1970) [hereinafter referred to as Nor-Am ($id. 197o) ].
8. Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 1970).
9. Id. at 6.
10. Note that the dissent in Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 197o), at 16, incorporates
by reference the majority opinion of Nor-Am (ATd. 197o).
11. For the purposes of the FIFRA, the:
term "economic poison" means (1) any substance or mixture of substances
intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any insects,
rodents, nematodes, fungi, weeds, and other forms of plant or animal life
or viruses, except viruses on or in living man or other animals, which the
Secretary shall declare to be a pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of
substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant or desicant.
7 U.S.C. § 135(a).
12. Id. § 135b(a). For the text of § 135b (a) see note 2 supra.
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formed to the requisite labeling regulations of the FIFRA."
In August, 1969, a hog raiser in Alamogordo, New Mexico,
obtained 4 waste grain products which had been contaminated with a
fungicide or fungicides containing mercury and fed them to his hogs as
a supplement to their diet.'5 After approximately a month of feeding on
the supplement a hog was butchered and, although showing signs of
illness, it was consumed by the family from September through December.
The remainder of the hogs either died or became blind in October, but
the family nevertheless continued to consume the previously butchered
hog. In December, three family members suffered permanent damage to
their central nervous systems resulting in nearly total blindness and
paralysis."6
On the evening of February 17, 1970, there was a portrayal and
discussion of the Alamogordo incident on a national broadcast of the
Huntley-Brinkley news program. The next day, Dr. Harry Hays,"
Director of the Pesticide Regulation Division of the Department of
Agriculture in charge of the area involved, sent a telegram to Nor-Am
in accordance with procedures established by the FIFRA,8 which stated
that in view of the recent accident, Nor-Am was thereby notified that
registrations of Panogen products were suspended. Dr. Hays sent a
13. Id. § 135b(b).
14. Although the record is not clear on how the waste grain products were
obtained, a report issued after the suspension indicated that the waste products were
stored by a nearby granary awaiting burning and were taken by the farmer without
permission. The manager of the granary told investigators that waste grain products
were never allowed to be sold or given away. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Public Health Services and Mental Health Administration, Mercurial Fungi-
cide Used in the Recent Alamogordo Incident (Feb. 27, 1970) cited in Appellant's
Reply Brief, at A-1.
The procedure followed by the granary in destroying waste grain sweepings and
screenings did conform to the directions, warnings, and cautions on the Panogen label.
The Health Services and Mental Health Administration Report, supra, also
indicated that the only fungicide that had been used at the granary in over a year was
Panogen and that it was very unlikely that the waste grain was stored for more than
a year.
15. Nor-Am's original complaint pointed out that all labeling on Panogen products
said, "Do not use this seed for food, feed or oil purposes." Appellees' Appendix,
Nor-Am (Jul. 1970), at 10-11.
16. The extent of the injuries to the three children is documented in a Mar. 27,
1970 report issued by the' Viral Diseases Branch, Epidemiology Program, cited in
Appellant's Brief, at A-1 to -3. As of the date of the report two of the children, ages
eight and thirteen, were still in a coma, and the third child, age twenty, was still
unable to care for herself.
17. The FIFRA authorizes the defendant-Secretary of Agriculture, Clifford M.
Hardin, to act. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c). This power was delegated to the defendant-
Administrator of the Agricultural Research Service, G. W. Irving, Jr. 30 Fed. Reg.
5801 (1965). He, in turn, delegated it to the defendant-Director of the Pesticide
Regulation Division, Harry W. Hays. 33 Fed. Reg. 15485, 15486 (1968).
18. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c).
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letter to Nor-Am on the same date justifying his action on the basis of
other reported incidents in which mercury treated seed screenings and
sweepings had been fed to livestock and disposed of in a manner resulting
in wildlife feeding on them."9
At the district court hearing, Dr. Hays admitted that, as of the date
of the suspension, he had assumed without evidence that the product
involved in the Alamogordo incident was Panogen. 0 The hearing also
revealed that Dr. Hays had no particular information or reason to
associate Panogen with the incidents other than Alamogordo, and all
reports of alleged incidents were completely undocumented and uninvesti-
gated.2
I. MAJORITY AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
The approach of Judge Cummings, writing for the majority in the
en banc rehearing, as to the dispositive issues presents a sharp contrast
to that of Judge Pell. The majority concluded that the plaintiff was
required to exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking
19. In elaborating the reasons for the emergency suspension, the letter further
stated:
The action . . . was based on the fact that the directions for use and
precautionary statements have failed to prevent treated seed from being used
as feed ....
In view of the insidious nature of alkyl mercury poisoning and the irrever-
sible injury to the central nervous system, we firmly believe that this class
of compounds should be discontinued for seed treatment. To allow new
stocks to enter channels of trade would increase the risk of injury to man and
other vertebrate animals.
Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 197o), at 3.
20. Although it was possible to identify the product which contained the grain,
no such tests had been conducted prior to the suspension. Nor-Ain (lid. 197o), at 9. It
should also be noted that:
the Secretary's order of February 18 applied only to Panogen. Other alkyl
mercury products used for seed treatment manufactured and sold by plaintiff's
competitors were not suspended until more than a month later.
Id.
21. Judge Pell noted that:
A representative of the companies involved met with Dr. Hays in
Washington shortly after the telegram was sent and interrogated the Director
with regard to the alleged incidents of animal poisoning in Oregon, California
and Texas. [These were the "other incidents" mentioned in the February 18
letter.] He [the company representative] stated that the companies had no
information regarding these facts and asked what he could be told regarding
them. Dr. Hays asked a member of his personnel to get the information
and the assistant returned with a manila folder and said that Panogen was
not involved in the Oregon incident. He further supplied the fact that the
only information they had regarding the California incident was the newspaper
clipping which mentioned mercury poisoning of birds, and there was no
information on the Texas incident....
Id. at 8.
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review, and not having done so review was thereby precluded.2 Judicial
review was not authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act 2 because
the order of the Secretary was neither a final agency order made
reviewable by the FIFRA, nor a final agency action for which there
was no adequate remedy at law. Furthermore, since there was no ir-
reparable harm, this case was not appropriate for disregarding the ex-
haustion requirement and granting equitable relief.24
The dissent viewed the problem quite differently, focusing instead
upon the functional impact of the order :25 If Panogen subsequently was
found to be hazardous in the expedited hearing, the emergency suspen-
sion would be finalized by permanent removal from the market; if not,
the suspension would be rescinded but Nor-Am would not be compensated
for interim losses26 resulting from the Secretary's arbitrary and capricious
determination of imminence. Consequently, the Secretary's determination
of the imminence of the hazard would never be reviewed and was in
effect a final order because the expedited hearing would consider only
22. Judge Cummings concluded: ". . . we are of the opinion that the district court
lacked power to grant this relief because the plaintiffs have not exhausted their
administrative remedy." Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov'. 1970), at 6.
23. The Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. V, 1965-
69), provides:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.
A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action. Except
as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is
final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented
or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of recon-
siderations, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides
that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency
authority.
24. Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 1970), at 13.
25. The reasons supporting the dissent's position appear in Nor-An, rehearing
(Nov. 197o), at 22. An expanded version of these reasons, incorporated by reference,
can be found in Nor-Am (Jul. 1970), at 14-15.
26. Judge Pell's argument is based upon the assumption that Nor-Am would
not be able to initiate a damage action at a later date. Though the issue has not been
fully settled, this assumption is probably correct. If the Secretary's determination is
categorized as discretionary, as it was by both the majority and dissent in Nor-Am,
then an abuse of discretion is not reviewable. In United States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498
(10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964), the court, after noting that the
plaintiff had established a strong prima facie case proving that the Secretary of
Interior had abused his discretion under the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315
et. seq. (1954), and showing that the plaintiff was injured thereby, stated: "The point
is that abuse of discretion does not impose liability on the United States." 331 F.2d at
502. The plaintiff in Morrell brought suit for trespass under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671 et. seq. (1964). See also Chournos v. United
States, 193 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 977 (1952). It is also
noteworthy that the absence or presence of malice has been held irrelevant. See
L. JAFFE, JUDICAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTIoN 248 n.52 (1965) ; 3 K, DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.08 (1st ed. 1958).
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the issue of hazardousness, and not that of imminence. The dissent
reasoned that, without a finding of imminence by the Secretary, the
suspension could not have preceded a hearing and a reviewable order.
Based upon this reasoning judge Pell asserted that the majority avoided
the decisive issue, which he characterized as "whether judicial intervention
is permissible in the event of arbitrary and capricious administrative
action. 111
III. THE FIFRA
Although emergency suspension powers, enabling agencies to react
more efficiently and quickly when the need arises, are not a new concept
to administrative law," those based upon imminent hazard determina-
tions are recent innovations for federal agencies. 9 In creating these
special powers, there has been recognition that special procedures are
necessary in order to mitigate the potentially harsh impact of an emergency
suspension upon a regulated party." Consequently, Congress has pro-
vided for notification to the regulated party prior to suspension,"'
27. Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 197o), at 17.
28. The history and need for emergency and temporary administrative action are
discussed by one commentator:
If the contagion is spreading, or the harmful medicinal preparation is being sold
to the public, summary administrative action in advance of hearing is appropriate.
In the judicial system, even when personal liberty is involved, tradition
permits imprisonment of the accused pending trial. Temporary restraining
orders against defendants who have had no opportunity to participate in an
ex parte hearing of the plaintiff are commonplace. Drastic administrative
action is sometimes essential to take care of problems that cannot be allowed
to wait for the completion of formal proceedings.
K. DAvis, ADmmsTRaATmVE LAw TEXT § 7.08, at 123 (1959). C.f. Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 609, 52 Stat. 973, 1011; Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717
et. seq. (1964); Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23; Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933. ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128.
29. In federal legislation the language "imminent hazard to the public" first
appeared in the Drug Amendments of 1962, 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1964), amending
Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 505(e), 52 Stat. 1040, 1053.
30. Senator Eastland, Chairman of Judiciary Committee to which the FIFRA
was referred, stated:
The bill includes a provision for immediate suspension of approval upon a
finding of an imminent hazard to the public health; in this case, the applicant
would have to be given prompt notice and an opportunity for an expedited
hearing. The Committee believes that this authority, which could have grave
effects upon a manufacturer and upon the confidence of the public in a drug
which might later be found appropriate for continued availability to physicians,
should only be exercised under the most extreme conditions and with the
utmost care.
108 CONG. Rc. 17366 (1962).
31. The House Report on the Drug Amendments of 1962 stated:
In the event the Secretary finds that there is an imminent hazard to public
health, he may suspend the approval of an application immediately but shall
give the applicant an opportunity for an expedited hearing. This authority
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expedited hearings,32 and specific warnings that these powers should
not be used indiscriminately."
While the FIFRA reflects this legislative concern for administrative
restraint, 4 its provisions for judicial review in the event of an indis-
criminate exercise of power by the Secretary are complicated by faulty
draftsmanship. Section 135b(d), which authorizes judicial review, pro-
vides that "any order under this section" may be reviewed upon appeal."5
Subsection (c), which authorizes emergency suspensions, provides that
"[f]inal orders of the Secretary under this section shall be subject to
judicial review, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (d) of
this section." 6 The interpretation problem thus becomes two-fold:
Whether the FIFRA permits appeals from "any order" or only from a
"final order" and, if only the latter, whether an emergency suspension
constitutes a final order for the purposes of judicial review.
The majority opinion reasoned that the specific provisions of sub-
section (c) limited the general provisions for review provided by sub-
section (d)." Furthermore, according to the majority, an emergency
suspension could not be construed as a "final order by the secretary,"
may be exercised only by the Secretary or an Acting Secretary. It would
be expected that in exercising this authority the Department would make every
effort, within the limits of its public responsibility, to notify the applicant and
allow him to advance arguments why summary suspension is not required, or
after suspension has been invoked, why it might safely be withdrawn pending
the hearing.
H.R. REP. No. 2464, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1962).
In the FIFRA, notification requirements appear in 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c). Note that
Nor-Am did not have a chance to contest the suspension before the proposed expedited
hearing.
32. In the FIFRA, the provision for an expedited hearing appears in 7 U.S.C. §
135b(c).
33. The Senate Report on the Drug Amendments of 1962 stated:
An "imminent hazard to public health" would exist when the evidence before
the Secretary shows that a drug is so unsafe as to create a public health
situation which must be corrected immediately, and cannot be permitted to
continue while a hearing is being held. The committee contemplates that this
power would be exercised only in the exceptional case of an emergency, which
does not permit the Secretary to correct it by other means.
S. REP. No. 1744 (pt. 2), 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1962).
34. See notes 30-31, 33 supra.
35. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (emphasis added). In the Nor-Am cases § 135b(d) is
referred to as § 4(d) of the 1964 amendments to the FIFRA. For partial text of §
135b(d) see note 2 supra.
36. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c). (emphasis added). Compare the more complete text of
§§ 135b(d) and 135b(c) as reproduced in note 2 supra.
37. . . . Implicit in . . . [Subsection (d)] is the limitation on judicial review
resulting from the specific extension on review in . . . [Subsection (c)]
only to "final orders of the Secretary." . . . [Subsection (d)] merely details
the procedural aspects of the judicial review permitted by . . [Subsection (c)].
NVor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 1970), at 8.
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since it is a "tentative, temporary measure" that contemplates further
agency action.8 The dissent, however, rejected the statutory construction
technique, and instead suggested that the reference to "final orders" in
subsection (c) is meaningless and simply an inadvertent carry-over from
the Food and Drug Act, upon which the imminent hazard and emergency
suspension provisions of the FIFRA were based. 9
Both attempts to resolve the confusion created by the draftsmanship
leave several unresolved questions. If the words "any order" in sub-
section (d) mean "final order," as the majority asserts, it is unclear
why Congress drafted subsection (d) in such broad terms. It is also
arguable that "final" can define, rather than exclude, an emergency
suspension. Moreover, the dissent's suggestion that "final order" was an
inadvertent carry-over is equally unpersuasive, since a survey of the
statutory history of the Food and Drug Act reveals no reference to
"final action" in relation to any orders, much less emergency suspension
orders.4"
A survey of the legislative history as to the reviewability of
emergency suspension orders is also unenlightening. The language "im-
minent hazard to the public" first appeared in federal legislation in the
1962 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,4 as
a limitation on the exercise of the Secretary's newly-acquired emergency
suspension power.4 The history of this amendment makes no reference
to immediate judicial review of an abuse of emergency suspension powers
for two possible reasons. First, there was a belief among the members
38. The majority noted that:
By its very nature and within the explicit 'purview of Section 4(c), the
emergency suspension of registration represents a tentative, temporary measure.
It is preliminary to more thorough administrative consideration of the hazardous
condition of the "poisons." The statute expressly contemplates special proceed-
ings to follow suspensions posthaste.
Nor-Amn, rehearing (Nov. 1970), at 8-9.
39. Nor-An (Jul. 1970), at 19-20.
40. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1964), provides:
(e) . . . if the Secretary . . . finds that there is an imminent hazard to the
public health, he may suspend the approval of such application immediately,
and give the applicant prompt notice of his action and afford the applicant
the opportunity for an expedited hearing under this subsection;...
(h) An appeal may be taken by the applicant from an order of the Secretary
refusing or withdrawing approval of an application under this section . ...
This was the only time "imminent hazard" appeared in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act and the word "final" has never appeared.
41. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1964), amending Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 505(e),
52 Stat. 1040, 1053.
42. Based upon a finding of an "imminent hazard to the public health" the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare could summarily suspend a license to
market a drug prior to a hearing. Id.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of Congress that these powers would not be used indiscriminately. 3
Second, an expedited agency hearing was established for quick and
efficient resolution of disputes arising from the Secretary's determina-
tion."
When the FIFRA amendments were enacted two years later, they were
based upon the Food and Drug Act." Like that of its predecessor, the
FIFRA's legislative history is silent with regard to review of an abuse
of emergency suspension power prior to the completion of an expedited
hearing. In addition, as of 1964, there had been no attempt to obtain pre-
hearing judicial review under the Food and Drug Act.46 Consequently,
although both the majority and dissenting opinions draw inferences from
statutory ambiguity and congressional silence, Congress, when enacting
the FIFRA, never anticipated an appeal prior to an expedited hearing
based upon the contention that the hazard was not imminent.
The dispute over whether an emergency suspension is a "final order"
within the meaning of the FIFRA is further complicated by a recent
decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin," which considered reviewability
43. The similarity of the emergency provisions of the FIFRA and the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is discussed at note 45 infra. Though most of the
FIFRA's legislative history is silent as to emergency suspensions, the legislative history
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act amendments indicate the congressional
desire for administrative restraint when exercising these emergency powers. See
notes 30-31 and 33 supra.
44. See note 30 supra. There is some indication that the expedited hearing is a
lengthly process. See also Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 1970), at 8-9 and Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Nor-Am,
counsel for appellee argued that the expedited hearing was illusory and pointed out that,
although Panogen was suspended on February 18, 1970, the Secretary's response to the
company's objections was not mailed to counsel until May 22, 1970 (Brief for Appellee
at 40, Nor-Am (Jul. 1970)), and the prehearing conference was not convened until the
first week in July. (Letter from Holland C. Capper to Howard B. Sandler, November
18, 1970, on file in Indiana University Law Library at Bloomington). See generally
Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 MicH. L. Rev. 1423 (1968).
45. This similarity was noted in the House Report: "The new procedure [FIFRA's
emergency suspension procedure] is modeled after that contained in § 408 of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act." H.R. REP. No. 1125, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1964).
It should be noted that § 408 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not deal
with the concept of "imminent hazard"; however, § 505(e), 21 U.S.C. § 355 (e) does.
Compare the statutory language of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, supra note 40,
with the statutory language of the FIFRA, supra note 2.
46. Nor has there been an appeal from an emergency suspension order prior to an
expedited hearing since 1964. However, subsequent to the enactment of the FIFRA
amendments, there have been several cases allowing review of an order notifying a
registrant of a non-emergency suspension of certification prior to an agency hearing.
See Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1969) and American Home
Products Corp. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 448 (D. Del. 1969).
47. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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issues analogous to those in Nor-Am. In Environmental Defense Fund,
plaintiffs" filed a petiton with the Secretary of Agriculture requesting,
(1) the issuance of [non-emergency] notices of cancellation
of all economic poisons containing DDT [on the basis of
hazardousness] (2) the [emergency] suspension [on the basis
of imminent hazardousness] for all such products pending the
conclusion of cancellation proceedings.49
In response the Secretary issued notices of cancellation of several uses of
DDT, solicited comments concerning the remaining uses, "and took no
action on the request for interim suspension. ' 50
Dissatisfied with the Secretary's response, plaintiffs sought immedi-
ate judicial review of his alleged abuse of administrative power. Judge
Bazelon remanded the case, holding that failure to issue non-emergency
notices of cancellation was not judicially reviewable prior to an adminis-
trative investigation and hearing. 1 With regard to the failure to issue
emergency interim suspensions of DDT prior to a hearing, the court held
that, if plaintiffs' claim of irreparable harm were valid, the Secretary's
inaction would be tantamount to a "final order" within the meaning of
the FIFRA and therefore reviewable, although there was no formal
"final order."52 The court's differing treatment of plaintiffs' request
for a regular suspension and its request for an emergency suspension
highlights the distinction between "hazardousness," the basis for per-
manent cancellation of a registration, and "imminent hazardousness,"
the basis for temporary emergency suspension. In this case the Secretary's
determination of "imminence" was held to be a final order, but the
determination of "hazardousness" would become a final order only upon
completion of a hearing. This distinction is the foundation upon which
Judge Pell based his dissent in Nor-Am."
48. Id. at 1095. The petitioners were five non-profit organizations engaged in
activities relating to environmental protection.
49. Id. at 1096.
50. Id.
51. The court stated that "[w]ith regard to the request for interim suspension of
the registration of DDT, we agree that inaction is tantamount to an order denying
suspension." Id. at 1099.
52. The court stated:
With respect to the request for notices of cancellation, we are more reluctant
to equate a tentative and equivocal delay with an outright denial of the
request. . . . But the statutory scheme of the FIFRhA itself contemplates a
lengthy inquiry into the conditions for the safe use of an economic poison before
its registration may finally be cancelled...
Id. at 1100.
53. See Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 197o), at 22:
Further administrative proceedings in the present case will be for a deter-
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IV. THE APA
Implicitly recognizing that the FIFRA itself is silent as to judicial
review, both the majority and dissent in Nor-Am turned to the question
of whether the Secretary's determination was a "final agency action"
for which section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act"' provides
review, and for which there would be no adequate remedy other than an
alternative form of judicial response as provided by section 703."5 The
majority, using a similar analysis as in interpreting "final order,"
characterized the Secretary's action as a temporary measure, thus con-
cluding that an emergency suspension was not a "final action.""6 Judge
Cummings supported his conclusion by reliance upon Ewing v. Mytinger
& Casselberry, Inc.," which presented a fact situation analogous to that
of Nor-Am. In Ewing, the plaintiff, exclusive national distributor of a
food supplement product, brought suit to enjoin enforcement of a multiple
seizure of misbranded articles under the authority of section 304(a)
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act5" prior to court proceedings
to condemn the product. The plaintiff contended that the Secretary's
determination of "probable cause" was arbitrary and capricious and,
because of the drastic impact of the multiple seizures upon the plaintiff's
business, the determination was "final agency action" within the meaning
of the Administrative Procedure Act.59 The Supreme Court, however,
held that the Secretary's probable cause finding was not reviewable
because the Secretary's action was preliminary in nature, although the
mination of whether there is a hazard to the public which would require
preclusion from the market place. On the other hand, the issue which precipitated
this litigation, determined without hearing and indeed without proper considera-
tion, was not the hazard question per se but the imminent hazard question.
54. The APA provides: "final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704. For the full text
of this section see note 23 supra.
55. The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review
proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in
the absence of inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action ....
5 U.S.C. § 703.
56. Nor-Ain, rehearing (Nov. 1970), at 10-11.
57. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
58. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 304(a), 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)
(1964) provided:
(a) Any article of food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or mis-
branded when introduced into or while in interstate commerce ... shall be liable
to be proceeded against . . .on libel of information and condemned in any
district court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which the article
is found: Provided, however, that . . . [multiple libel proceedings cannot be
instituted except] (2) when the Secretary has probable cause to believe from
facts found, without hearing . .. that the misbranded article is dangerous to
health ....
59. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 10 (c), 60 Stat. 243, as amended 5 U.S.C. § 704.
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impact upon the regulated party was onerous."
Judge Pell, however, was not persuaded by the majority's analogy to
Ewing:
It is significant in Ewing that the challenge was not to the
seizure itself but to the determination, without hearing, of
probable cause for the initiation of the suits. The company, how-
ever, by virtue of the initiation of the suits was in court and
could raise questions for judicial determination. Actually, while
the administrative agency made the probable cause determina-
tion, the exercise of the discretion as to whether suit should be
filed was made by the Attorney General."
The dissent also pointed out that the concept of "final agency action"
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner"2 to be flexible, requiring the courts to examine the impact of
the agency action upon the affected party. 3 Justice Harlan, writing for
6C. Judge Cummings cited other cases in addition to Ewing holding a deter-
mination by an administrative agency was not final, although the impact upon the
regulated party was drastic. Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589
(1931); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947). But note the differing statutory schemes of these cases. In Phillips, supra, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, under the summary procedure permitted by § 280(a)
(1) of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 61, determined that certain stock-
holders who received the assets of a dissolved corporation were liable to pay income and
profits taxes of the corporation. Held, the liability of the taxpayers was not reviewable
until after the tax due was paid, but if, upon review later, the petitioners prevailed, they
would receive a refund. In Bowles, supra, the Price Administrator, pursuant to the rent
control provision of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23,
established a maximum rental on certain property before a hearing, which petitioner
sought to enjoin in a state court proceeding. Held, review was not appropriate until the
pending administrative hearing was concluded. Section 204(c) of the Act, 56 Stat. at
32, specifically provided that the reviewing court would not have power to "issue any
temporary restraining order or interlocutory decree staying or restraining, in whole or
in part' the Price Administrator's determination. In Fahey, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, under the authority of Section 5(d) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of
1933, ch. 64, 48 Stht. 128, appointed a conservator to take possession of a federal sav-
ings and loan association prior to a hearing. Held, stockholders could not seek review of
the action because the statute vested the Board with complete discretionary power.
61. Nor-Am (Jul. 970), at 13.
62. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Abbott involved a drug manufacturer's request for a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from pre-enforcement of a eneral agency
regulation promulgated and issued by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs. The
regulation would have required extensive changes in drug labeling requirements, and
non-compliance would have subjected the manufacturer to criminal penalties. The manu-
facturer claimed that the new regulation exceeded the statutory authority of the Com-
missioner given him by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Held, manufacturer's suit was
within the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act, and since
the regulation was "final agency action" within the meaning of the APA the issue was
ripe for review.
63. Id. The Abbott Court emphasized the strong 'presumption of judicial review,
and then, noting that the real issue in determining "finality" is not the form of the order,
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the majority in Abbott, responded to the contention of the Commissioner
of Food and Drugs that Ewing precluded review of a regulation prior
to its enforcement regardless of its harsh consequences by stating:
To equate a finding of probable cause for proceeding against
a particular drug manufacturer [in Ewing] with the promul-
gation of a self-operating industry-wide regulation [in Abbott]
would immunize nearly all agency rulemaking activities from
the coverage of the Administrative Procedure Act.64
Judge Cummings, while recognizing that Abbott required the court to
examine the impact of the agency action, concluded that the procedural
scheme of the FIFRA nevertheless precluded review."5
The rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies is well-
established. 6 Judge Cummings set forth the traditional policies for not
permitting premature review as follows:
Even the limited review here contemplated nullifies the need
or utility of the further agency action desired by Congress.
The administrative process is interrupted before issues have
been crystalized and narrowed and without affording op-
portunity for application of technical expertise and informed
judgment.... Judicial scrutiny of the accuracy and correctness
of the Secretary's emergency suspension largely abrogates need
of expedition of further agency proceedings. At the very
least, however, the agency must postpone its further proceedings
(even if it plans ultimately to expedite them) pending the
outcome of judicial review. Not only may this aggravate the
harm suffered by the innocent registrant by prolonging litiga-
tion, but it unnecessarily encumbers governmental efforts and
may have the adverse effect of coloring further agency actions."
but the impact, stated: "The cases dealing with judicial review of administrative actions
have interpreted the "finality" element in a pragmatic way." Id. at 149. See generally
Note, Administrative Law: Pre-Enforcement Review of FDA Regulations, 52 MINN. L.
REV. 872 (1968) ; Note, Administrative Law-Judicial Review Pre-Enforcement Review
Under Inexplicit Statute and the Problem of Ripeness-Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967), 17 Am. U.L. REv. 323 (1968).
64. 387 U.S. at 147.
65. Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 1970), at 10 states:
The flexibility of the finality concept does not, however, permit facile disregard
of the purposes of congressional delegation of power and of the clear procedural
scheme delineated in this particular statute.
66. See L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 424-26 (1965) ; 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 26, at
§20.01 (1st ed. 1958); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938);
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
67. Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 1970), at 11-12.
Query: Since the district court's injunction had nothing to do with preventing a
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Professor Jaffe suggests certain assumptions upon which the rule is based:
The requirement of exhaustion "implies that the remedy is (a) available
to [the affected party] on his initiative (b) more or less immediately
and (c) will substantially protect his claim of right.""8 However, if one
or more of these assumptions is not valid when applied to a fact situation,
review has been held appropriate prior to the exhaustion of the adminis-
trative process,"0 although the courts generally couch this result in
terms of the "irreparable injury" the aggrieved party would suffer.7"
In Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States,7 for example, the Federal
Maritime Board granted pre-hearing approval to an agreement by a
conference of companies which had the effect of giving lower rates to
shippers who dealt exclusively with the conference. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Board's approval was
reviewable because the plaintiff, who was not a conference member,
would suffer irreparable injury through loss of revenues while waiting
for the hearing to be completed. The court equated the pre-hearing
approval with a final order when it stated, ". . . a final order need not
necessarily be the very last order [of the agency] .,72
hearing, but only dealt with enjoining the emergency suspension prior to the hearing,
why would the hearing process have to be postponed? Are the two proceedings mutually
exclusive?
68. L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 424.
69. See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964) ; McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Allen v. Grand Cent. Air-
craft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947) ; Order of Railroad Conductors of America v. Swan, 329
U.S. 520 (1947); Public Util. Comm'n. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943);
Illinois Commerce Comm'n. v. Thompson, 318 U.S. 675 (1943) ; Skinner & Eddy Corp. v.
United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919) ; Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904).
70. See, e.g., National Air Carriers Ass'n. v. C.A.B., 27 Ad. L.2d 1, (D.C. Cir. May
28, 1970) ; Isbrandtsen v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 989 (1954) ; C.B.S. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942) ; A.B.C. v. FCC, 191 F.2d
492 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Merchants Delivery Co. v. U.S., 265 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Mo.
1967); Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 944(6th Cir. 1970); American Home Products Corp. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 448 (D. Del.
1969).
Two major treatises on administrative law take the position that the APA, 21 U.S.C.§ 701 et seq., was meant to codify the previously formulated rule that exhaustion was not
required in cases where irreparable injury would result. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 424-37;
3 K. DAvis, mpra note 26, at § 20.08. See also SENATE JUDIcIARY Comm. REPORT, S.
Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 369 (1946) and Statement of Attorney General in
Appendix at 230.
Prior case law demonstrates that, in cases of irreparable injury, review is allowed
before exhaustion. L. JAFFE, vipra note 26, at 431; 3 K. DAvIs, supra note 26, at § 20.01.
See also Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n., 306 U.S. 56 (1939)(Threat of revealing a confidential document).
71. 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
72. Id. at 55. See also Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 334, 337(1st Cir. 1953) ; C.B.S. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 422 (1942) ; Rochester Telephone
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One of the major sources of disagreement in Nor-Am was whether
the plaintiff had suffered irreparable injury. Although the dissent found
finality in the order because the plaintiff's losses were unrecoupable, s
the majority viewed the hardship as a cost of litigation under the
statutory scheme:
We do not mean to demean plaintiffs' possible losses when
noting moreover, that the temporary suspension affects busi-
ness profits, not the very existence of the commodities plaintiffs
seek to purvey. Where public health and safety demand emer-
gency removal of a commodity from the market even unre-
coverable financial losses incurred pendente lite must be deemed
an expense of litigation itself.74
The distinction between the categories of costs of litigation per se and
collateral irreparable loss caused by the litigation, which the court
coalesced, has always been a subtle one. In Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp.,75 plaintiff sought an injunction to stop the National
Labor Relations Board from holding hearings concerning unfair labor
practices. The asserted basis for the injunction was plaintiff-employer's
complaint that if the NLRB were permitted to hold hearings without
jurisdiction, the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury because the
hearings would cause employee dissatisfaction, and would place a heavy
financial burden on the employer."0 Justice Brandeis, writing for the
Court, rejected plaintiff's claim of collateral consequences:
• . . the rule requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy
Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143-44 (1939) ; Phillips v. SEC, 171 F.2d 180, 183
(2nd Cir. 1948).
The Supreme Court also utilized this approach in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184(1958), a case dealing with a similar decision by the National Labor Relations Board. In
Leedom the Supreme Court held that a ruling by the NLRB was reviewable under the
APA even though the NLRB had not issued a "final order" as required by § 10(f) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964). The controversy arose
when a labor organization, contrary to the provisions of § 9(b) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 159(b) (1) (1964), refused to take a vote among professional employees before repre-
senting the professionals in bargaining. The NLRB, over the objections of complaining
professionals, included both professional and non-professional employees in the bargain-
ing unit.
73. Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 1970), at 16.
74. Id. at 14.
75. 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
76. Id. at 53. Other examples of costs of litigation per se, which the plaintiff in
Myers contended were collateral irreparable losses caused by litigation, were that the
hearings would cause irreparable harm because they would discredit the current Plan of
Representation in the eyes of plaintiff's employees; that the employees would be deprived
of their right to negotiate by the method of their choice; and that the operation of the
plant would be disrupted. Id.
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cannot be circumvented by asserting that the charge on which
the complaint rests is groundless and that the mere holding of
the prescribed administrative hearing would result in irreparable
damage. Lawsuits also often prove to have been groundless; but
no way has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the
necessity of a trial to establish the fact.7"
Judge Cummings' analogy between the plaintiff's alleged potential
losses in Myers and the actual losses acknowledged in Nor-Am is
tenuous. In Myers, the plaintiff sought to preclude the hearing completely,
and the Court simply considered the inevitable burdens that litigants
must endure in order that facts may be determined.7 ' The plaintiff in
Nor-Am, however, was contesting the consequences of administrative
action additional to the costs of the ensuing proceedings, that is, removal
from the market, rather than the inevitable burdens of the proceedings
themselves.
The majority's assertion that Nor-Am's losses must be viewed as
a cost of litigation is indicative of its underlying policy decision to
protect the Secretary's emergency discretionary powers against judicial
intrusion. The majority took the position that the statutory scheme is the
single, indivisible means of protecting the public's health and safety,
7
and once this essential policy decision had been made, the case was
functionally resolved. The inevitable question that must be raised by this
decision is: How far would the majority go to insulate this scheme from
interference? The Secretary contended ° that the permissive language
of section 135b(c) of the FIFRA which states that the Secretary "may
. suspend the registration of an economic poison,"'" precluded
review under the APA since section 701 specifically excludes agency
actions "committed to agency discretion by law."82 The majority chose
77. Id. at 51-52.
78. The expense and woe of litigation are risks to which whatever the modes
of justice-and though one may win in the end-we are all subject. There are,
however, certain collateral risks of litigation which the law should seek to min-
imize.
L. JAriE, supra note 26, at 428-29.
79. Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 1970). 'Where public health and safety demand
emergency removal of a commodity from the market . .. ." Id. at 14. See also Nor-Am
(Jul. 1970). "Congress balanced the public and private interests in fashioning not only the
Secretary's discretionary power to suspend registration but also the administrative pro-
cedures to follow exercise of that power." Id. at 32-33.
86. Brief for Appellants at 24, Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. i97o).
81. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c).
82. The APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) provides:
This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent
that-
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not to adopt the Secretary's contention and instead relied upon its
exhaustion theory,83 thereby precluding complete insulation from judicial
intrusion. Moreover, the majority avoided adding another piece of
kindling to the fiery debate over whether arbitrary and capricious deci-
sions in matters committed to agency discretion are ever reviewable."4
In disposing of the case on the exhaustion requirement, the court has
struck a compromise: on one hand, the Secretary's determination of
imminence of hazard is normally unreviewable in the first instance; on
the other hand, if abuse is flagrant enough in a future case, as it might
be if a suspension included a broad range of products without justifica-
tion, 5 a court is not precluded from determining that the administrative
remedy would be inadequate and, therefore, allowing review.
V. CONCLUSION
The Nor-Am decision raises several questions concerning the dis-
cretionary power of the Secretary and the statutory scheme of the
FIFRA. The court was unrealistic in its characterization of that harm
which befell Nor-Am as not irreparable. First, Nor-Am is out of business
until a hearing and investigation are completed because Panogen pro-
ducts comprise approximately 90 per cent of its sales."8 Second, although
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
83. See Nor-Am (Jul. 1970), at 32 where, in the footnote, Judge Cummings sug-
gests that analogous cases may have been decided upon the "commited to agency
discretion" provision of the APA.
84. The controversy over whether an abuse of agency discretion is ever reviewable
has been dealt with extensively in a continuing debate beween Kenneth Culp Davis and
Raoul Berger. Davis contends that some abuses are not always reviewable while Berger
asserts that abuses of discretion by an agency are always reviewable. See Berger, Ad-
ininistrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 55; 4 DAvis § 28.16
(Supp. 1965) ; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 783 (1966) ; Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 814 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to
Professor Davis' "Final Word", 114 U. PA. L. REV. 816 (1966) ; Davis, Administrative
Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 823 (1966) ; Berger, Administrative
Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1967) ; Davis, Administrative Arbitrari-
ness is Not Always Re'viezuable, 51 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1967) ; Berger, Administrative
Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L. J. 965 (1969).
85. See Nor-Am (Jul. 1970), at 9 where Judge Pell notes that:
Apparently on the assumption that the Alamogordo incident was caused by
Panogen (although this assumption is not necessarily supported by persuasive
evidence) the Secretary's order of February 18 applied only to Panogen. Other
alkyl mercury products used for seed treatment manufactured and sold by
plaintiff's competitors were not suspended until more than a month later. There
was no indication if in fact the distribution of Panogen constituted an imminent
hazard to the public, that other alkyl mercury products were less hazardous
to the public.
86. Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of Mr. Charles Hutchinson, Product
Manager of Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc., at 100. "Sale of Panogen products
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the statute purports to describe the hearing process as "expedited," there
is a strong suggestion that this procedure is a lengthy one." Finally,
the impact of the decision is further magnified by the fact that loss of
Panogen will reduce agricultural productivity and could result in an
epidemic.8 Considering Judge Bazelon's pragmatic determination of
finality in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,"9 which re-
cognized the reviewability distinction between hazardousness and im-
minence, and holds that the Secretary's power is not discretionary,"
the majority's decision in Nor-Am creates an area of uncertainty9 '
amounts to about $4,000.00 per day." Nor-Am (Jul. 97o), at 4.
87. See note 44 supra.
88. See Nor-Am, rehearing (Nov. 197o), at 14 where the majority discusses the
nature of the claimed irreparable injury:
The primary interests threatened in this case are not public but private. They
are interests of property rather than of life or liberty. Although plaintiffs claim
danger to farmers and consumers from removal of their products, their direct
and immediate concern is the impact of suspension upon their businesses.
But see, in the Transcript of Proceedings in the district court, at 29-65 (April 13,
1970), Mr. Laurel C. Meade, General Manager of the Agricultural Alumni Seed Improve-
ment Association, a non-profit corporation under contract with Purdue University,
testified that he had used Panogen for ten years. Id. at 33. Panogen is the most effective
treatment to control soil-borne diseases, such as seedling blights, damping-off disease,
and smuts. Id. at 33-34. "The suspension of mercury seed treatment products . . . [w] ill
have a far more deleterious effect on agriculture production and the eventual price of
consumer food than any harmful effect it has ever had or ever would have .... " Id.
at 46-47.
It is possible that Judge Cummings' statement concerning private, rather than public
interests, may raise an issue of standing. See generally L. JAFFE, supra 459-543 and Keco
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233, 1238 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
89. 428 F.2d 1093.
90. Id. In response to the Secretary's contention that, because the FIFRA was
drafted in permissive terms the determination of imminence is committed to agency
discretion and is therefore not reviewable, Judge Bazelon stated:
Preclusion of judicial review is not lightly to be inferred, however; it requires
a showing of clear evidence of legislative intent. That evidence cannot be found
in the mere fact that a statute is drafted in permissive rather than mandatory
terms .... We conclude that his decision is not thereby placed beyond judicial
scrutiny.
Id. at 1098. See also Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
91. See Nor-Am (Jul. 1970), where Judge Cummings in the footnote distinguishes
the applicability of Environnzental Defense Fund on the grounds that it dealt with an
exception to the rules of review "because the refusal to act in fact represents agency
disposition of a matter." Id. at 32. But see, City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S.
162 (1969), citing Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939),
where, in a case involving reviewability of the Interstate Commerce Commission's deci-
sion not to investigate under § 13a(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §
13a(1) (1964), a railroad's request for discontinuance of interstate passenger service, the
Court stated:
We conclude, therefore, that any distinction, as such, between 'negative' and
'affirmative' orders, as a touchstone of jurisdiction to review the Commission s
orders, serves no useful purpose, and insofar as earlier decisions have been
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in administrative law which makes the reviewability issue appropriate
for determination by the Supreme Court.
HOWARD B. SANDLER
controlled by this distinction, they can no longer be guiding.
See also Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,708
(D.C. Cir., July 8, 1970).
